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Abstract
This is an attempt to apply Nagel’s distinction between internal
and external statements to the interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics. I propose that this distinction resolves the contradiction between
unitary evolution and the projection postulate. I also propose a more
empirically realistic version of the projection postulate. The result is a
version of Everett’s relative-state interpretation, including a proposal
for how probabilities are to be understood.
Based on a talk given at the 9th UK Foundations of Physics meet-
ing in Birmingham on 12 September 2000.
In this talk I want to explore the possibility of a connection between
the problem of understanding quantum mechanics and a number of classical
philosophical problems. For this purpose, I will at first focus on the mea-
surement problem, which can be given a conveniently concise formulation:
the contradiction between the Schro¨dinger equation and the projection pos-
tulate. We appear (at least immediately after reading our first quantum
mechanics textbook) to have good reason to believe both of these incompat-
ible statements. The problems to which I want to compare the measurement
problem can also be formulated as contradictions between pairs of statements
or principles, both of which we seem to have good reason to believe:
1. The existence of space-time vs the passage of time;
2. Determinism vs free will;
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3. The physical description of brain states vs conscious experience;
4. Duty vs “Why should I?”
One thing that all of these oppositions have in common with that between
the Schro¨dinger equation and the projection postulate is that in every case
one of the statements is a general universal statement — what Nagel [14]
calls “a view from nowhere” — to which assent seems to be compelled by
scientific investigation or moral reflection; the other is a matter of immediate
experience (a view from “now here”). In other ways there may seem to be
less similarity between the problem of quantum mechanics and the others.
One difference for me personally is that although the contradiction between
the Schro¨dinger equation and the projection postulate is sharp and uncom-
fortable, I do not see any contradiction in most of the other cases. This, of
course, is favourable for my project: if I can succeed in establishing a relation
between all these pairs, then I can hope that the solvent that removes the
other contradictions will also work on the quantum-mechanical one. First,
however, I have to recall the other contradictions to myself so that I can see
how they go away.
For some of my audience, I think, all of the above contradictions have
sharp teeth. In an attempt to bring us all together to share the experience
of summoning up a vanished tension and watching it relax, I would like to
start by considering the problem of my title. This is slightly different from
the others, in that it is not a contradiction, but it brings us very directly
to what I take to be the insight of Nagel [13, 14], which he applied to the
other contradictions and which I will attempt to apply to the interpretation
of quantum mechanics.
WHY AM I ME?
At the age when philosophy is a natural and urgent activity, children often
ask “Why am I me?”. What can they mean by this question? “I” and “me”
are different grammatical forms of the same substantive; they have the same
referent. How can it be problematical that they are identical? Yet what the
question seems to be expressing is the sense that it is contingent that I am
me. Can that make sense? Might I not have been Tony Sudbery — might I
have been Mick Jagger? Clearly not; “I”, when spoken by me, denotes Tony
Sudbery, and Mick Jagger is a different person. It is not logically possible
that these distinct individuals could be equal. But the child in me would say
“Yes, I might have been Mick Jagger” and I understand him; there seems to
be a sense in which that is true. If so, the subject of the sentence cannot
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after all be “Tony Sudbery”. Attempts to identify the true subject of the
sentence might lead me astray, towards “I who am inside Tony Sudbery”
or “I who experience the world as Tony Sudbery”, but Nagel has shown a
better way. Let us just say that “I” is not always a simple synonym for
the (objectively definable) speaker; it sometimes refers to the experiencing
subject. In the world of each of us, there are many human beings, but there
is only one experiencing subject. It would be a neat theory to declare that
children ask “Why am I me?” at an age when they have only just realised that
other people also experience the world as subjects, but I doubt if this is true.
The human faculty of projection, of seeing other human bodies as persons,
probably develops before the faculty of language. Nevertheless, the question
expresses the tension between the knowledge that there are many persons,
each of whom experiences the world in the same way that I do, and the more
immediately known fact that there is only one such experience to which I
can directly attest. It is contingent that that directly attested experience is
what it happens to be in my life; that I (the experiencing subject) am me
(Tony Sudbery).
THE FLOW OF TIME
Many physicists find a contradiction between their experience of time and
the description of time that they give as physicists. For example:
1. For us convinced physicists the distinction between past, present and
future is an illusion, although a persistent one. (Einstein [10])
2. Things don’t happen in spacetime, they simply are. (Paul Davies [7])
3. Relativity . . . seems incapable of describing the flow of time at all:
past, present and future co-exist in a four-dimensional “block”, dubbed
space-time. (Bernard Carr [5])
4. There seems to be no strong reason for supposing that the flow of time
is any more than an illusion produced by brain processes similar to the
perception of rotation during dizziness. (Paul Davies [7])
I don’t myself share this sense of contradiction. If the flow of time is an il-
lusion, what is it that we mistakenly believe when we are under this illusion?1
Not that time flows, because that doesn’t make sense: only substances flow,
and time is not a substance. Paul Davies’s illusion, in fact, is itself illusory.
1A similar question can be asked about the supposed illusion of free will.
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Einstein’s assertion that there is no distinction between past, present and
future, on the other hand, seems to be simply mistaken.The past, the present
and the future are the sets of events with time coordinates t satisfying t < t0,
t = t0 and t > t0 respectively, where t0 is a certain time which I can specify
— 11.20 on 8 September, 2000, actually. It is no illusion that there is a
distinction between these sets; they are distinct sets. What lies behind this
idea of an illusion, of course, is Einstein’s discovery that the distinction differs
from observer to observer. This does not alter the fact that in every frame of
reference (and for every choice of t0) there is such a distinction, and it does
not make the distinction any less real and objective.
However, arguments about the relativistic meaning of past, present and
future seem to miss the essential point. The immediate application of these
terms is to events in one individual’s experience, that is to events on a par-
ticular worldline. The division of these events into past, present and future
is relativistically invariant — though it does, of course, depend on the spec-
ification of a particular event on the worldline as “now”.
The other quotations above are even easier to demolish. It is true that
things (Davies means “events”) are in space-time, but why does that mean
that they don’t happen? Happening, as a matter of linguistic fact, is just
what events do. Finally, if Davies’s statement (4) is a meaningless expression
of subjective experience, Carr’s description (3) of objective space-time is
clearly self-contradictory, or becomes so if we replace “co-exist” by “exist at
the same time”, which is what Carr seems to mean. It is obviously not true
that all the events in space-time exist at the same time, for events are defined
by coordinates (t, x, y, z), and they do not all have the same time t.
But having fun with the daft things that physicists say about time doesn’t
shed much light on the question of why there is such a widespread feeling that
physicists’ notion of space-time contradicts what we know from experience
about time. My comment on Carr’s statement (3) reduces this contradiction
to a confusion between the time at which an event happens and the time at
which it is discussed; but recognising this distinction doesn’t seem to remove
the puzzlement which we often feel when thinking about time in our own
lives. It was this which was expressed by St. Augustine:
How can the past and future be when the past no longer is
and the future is not yet? As for the present, if it were always
present and never moved on to become the past, it would not be
time but eternity.
I want to analyse this puzzlement in two different but related ways. First,
there is a sense that statements referring to the present and the future cannot
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both be true, because they contradict each other. Consider a prisoner who is
due to be released this weekend. His being in prison and his being free cannot
both be true; hence if it is true that he is in prison, the future (in which he is
free) cannot exist. Logically, the resolution is easy: the two states have been
incompletely described, and if we complete them by specifying their time they
are not contradictory: being in prison on 8 September is certainly compatible
with being free on 15 September. But in terms of actual experience a sense
of contradiction remains. Our experience is completely specified without a
time label — we only experience one thing at a time — and adding time
labels does not make imprisonment and freedom compatible states in our
experience. The prisoner, desperately longing for next week, finds it hard to
really believe that he will be free because he all too clearly is in prison. The
purely intellectual acknowledgement of the truth of a statement referring to
a remote time is shadowy and pale in comparison to the vivid knowledge of
what we are experiencing now. The first is an external statement; the second
is internal.
The second point to note starts as a linguistic one. Augustine points out
that it cannot be true to say that the future exists because it is not yet.
This contradicts the physicist’s assertion that all the events of space-time
simply are. Augustine would say that this is wrong; it is not true that future
events are, only that they will be. We cannot make a statement in ordinary
language without giving it a tense. In the mathematical language in which,
fortunately, statements of physics can be expressed, this restriction does not
operate. In this language we can express the prisoner’s present confinement
and his future freedom by considering his time-dependent state |ψ(t)〉 and
using the tenseless = sign to write
|ψ(8 September)〉 = |in prison〉,
|ψ(15 September)〉 = |free〉.
Philosophers sometimes enviously adopt this feature of mathematical ex-
pression by inventing a “tenseless” form of verbs in ordinary language. This
distinction between tensed and tenseless statements can help to explain the
perceived tension between the existence of space-time and our experience of
time: physical statements about events in space-time (external statements)
are tenseless, whereas statements that we make in space-time are always
tensed, with an implied “now”. The reason why space-time is taken to be
an odd idea, contradicting our intuition, is that statements about it (like
Davies’s (2)) are tenseless statements expressed in a language that has no
tenseless forms. They are therefore falsely understood as tensed statements,
as which they appear commensurate with the tensed statements of our experi-
ence, and may indeed contradict them. My argument that this contradiction
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can be resolved depends on the existence of a translation from a tensed state-
ment, together with its context, to a tenseless one, in which one moves the
context (the identification of “now”) into the statement; thus
“I will be free in one week’s time” uttered on 8 September
translates to
|ψ(15 September)〉 = |free〉.
EXTERNAL SMOOTHNESS, INTERNAL COLLAPSE
I now want to propose that a distinction between internal and external
statements like that between tensed and tenseless ones, or between an ex-
periencing subject (I) and a physically identified body (me), can be used
to resolve the contradiction between the two conflicting laws of evolution
in quantum mechanics: the discontinuous, probabilistic change in the state
vector following a measurement, given by the projection postulate, and the
continuous, deterministic evolution given by the Schro¨dinger equation. The
idea, roughly speaking, is that the Schro¨dinger equation is an external state-
ment, while the projection postulate is an internal one. More precisely, let
|Ψ(t)〉 be a time-labelled sequence of states satisfying the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion. Then it is an external (and tenseless) statement that the world passes
through the sequence of states |Ψ(t)〉. Suppose that at early times the state
is a product |φ〉|ψ〉 where |φ〉 is a state of a measuring apparatus and a con-
scious observer, while |ψ〉 is the state of the rest of the world (or simply the
system being measured by the apparatus), and suppose the Hamiltonian in-
cludes an instantaneous measurement made at time t0. Then the solution of
the Schro¨dinger equation with this Hamiltonian and these initial conditions
will be of the form
|Ψ(t0 + ε)〉 =
∑
n
cn|φn〉|ψn〉
where the |ψn〉 are eigenstates of the measured observable, cn are the coeffi-
cients in the expansion of |ψ〉 in terms of these eigenstates, and |φn〉 is the
state of the apparatus and observer in which the apparatus registers the re-
sult n and the observer is aware of that result. This is an external statement
(about the whole universe), but it is compatible with the internal statement
(a tensed one, with a “now” of t0 + ε) that after the measurement the state
|ψ〉 has jumped to one of the eigenstates |ψn〉, the warrant for which is the
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experienced fact that the observer’s state has jumped to the corresponding
|φn〉.
The apparatus-observer state |φn〉 can be analysed as
|φn〉 = |“The result is n”〉|αn〉
in which |αn〉 is an apparatus state and a ket symbol containing a quoted
statement represents a state of the observer in which they believe that state-
ment. Thus the external description of the universe is the superposition
|Ψ(t0 + ε)〉 =
∑
n
cn|“The result is n”〉|αn〉|ψn〉.
We see very clearly here that it is correct to call the statements of the result
of the measurement “internal statements”: they occur inside the external
statement, as part of the physical world. They are configurations of a physical
system, namely the brain of the observer. But they are also propositions.
What is their status as propositions: are they true or false? Each is believed
by a brain which has observed the fact it describes, and that fact belongs
to reality. As a human belief, each statement could not be more true. Yet
they cannot all be true, for they contradict each other. I take this to be
characteristic of internal statements in a physical system; the belief of such a
statement is a physical occurrence, and its truth can only be assessed in the
physical context in which it occurs. In the present situation, such a context
consists of a particular component of the universal state |Ψ(t)〉.
PROBABILITIES
Clearly what I am proposing here is an understanding of Everett’s relative-
state interpretation. Notoriously, this interpretation has a problem with the
probability statements of quantum mechanics. The distinction between in-
ternal and external statements opens a new approach to this problem. There
are two aspects to this. First, probabilities are attached to the results of
measurements. But statements about the results of measurements must be
internal — it is only from a particular perspective that a measurement has
a result — so we must be prepared to accept that probabilities are only rel-
evant to internal statements. A statement of probabilities will not be itself
an internal statement, but it will be about internal statements.
Secondly, I find that I cannot understand probabilities in quantum me-
chanics unless I move to a formulation of the probabilistic law about the
results of experiments which is slightly different from the usual one: not
equivalent to it, but somewhat stronger — though no stronger, I believe, than
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the (unformulated) law which is actually used by the practitioners of quan-
tum mechanics. I have argued elsewhere [19] that the conventional postulate,
referring to the results of measurements, is not an adequate description of
empirical reality. Not only is it incompletely specified, relying as it does on
an undefined notion of “measurement”, but it also fails to give any answer
to many experimental questions to which physicists need answers. It as-
sumes that all experiments can be described as instantaneous measurements
in which the experimenter actively provokes the system under investigation
into providing a result, and consequently changing its state, by means of an
instantaneous (or at least sharply time-dependent) intervention. This does
not cover, and cannot be adapted to cover [19], the common situation in
which the experiment consists of passively observing the system as it spon-
taneously changes, and the experimental setup is constant over an extended
period of time.
In order to cover this situation of continuous observation, the probabilistic
statements need to be in the form of transition probabilities. A convincing
postulate was proposed by Bell [3]. In a generalised form ([18], p. 216),
it consists of the assumption that the state of the system is always in one
of a certain set of subspaces Sm, and that it moves stochastically from one
subspace to another with transition probabilities which are determined by
the solution |Ψ(t)〉 of the Schro¨dinger equation as follows. Let Πm be the
projection onto the subspace Sm(t), and let |ψm(t)〉 = Πm|Ψ(t)〉. Then at
time t the system is in one of the states |ψm(t)〉, and if it is in |ψm(t)〉 at
time t then the probability that it will be in |ψn(t + δt)〉 (where n 6= m) at
time t+ δt is Tnmδt where
Tmn =
max(Jmn, 0)
〈ψn(t)|ψn(t)〉
, (1)
Jmn =
2
ℏ
Im〈ψm(t)|H|ψn(t)〉. (2)
(This has been generalised to the case of time-dependent Πm by Baccia-
galuppi and Dickson [2].) It follows from these transition probabilities that
the usual probabilities for the results of measurements of Πm(t) hold at all
times if they hold at any one time.
At first sight there is a deeply unattractive and implausible feature of this
proposal: it depends on the choice of the subspaces Sm(t), i.e. on a choice of
preferred observable. Thus it appears to break the general unitary symmetry
of quantum mechanics. But in the framework I am proposing here this is
no vice. A report of an experimental result is an internal statement, made
by a physical system which is capable of formulating propositions about its
environment and having attitudes of belief towards those propositions — in
8
short, a conscious system. (I use the word “conscious” reluctantly, because I
do not want to be understood as restricting the discussion to human beings,
but it seems to be what I mean). A general statement about experimental
results must therefore be made relative to the conscious system which reports
the results. A conscious system, regarded as a conscious system, automati-
cally defines a preferred set of subspaces, namely those consisting of states in
which the conscious system has definite experiences — what Lockwood [12]
calls the consciousness basis, though I will use the term experience basis.2
If we are making general statements about the experiences of conscious sys-
tems, there is no loss of unitary symmetry in making each statement depend
on the experience basis of the system to which it refers. This is the same
as the way that statements about energy in special relativity are necessarily
relative to a particular frame of reference; nevertheless, general statements
about energy (for example, the conservation of energy) are possible and do
not break relativistic invariance.
We thus arrive at the following general formulation of the laws of motion
in quantum mechanics:
1. The universe is described by a time-dependent state vector |Ψ(t)〉 in
the universal state space S, which evolves according to the Schro¨dinger
equation.
2. The experience of any conscious subsystem C of the universe is de-
scribed at any time t by a state vector |φn〉 in the experience basis of
that subsystem’s state space SC . If this experience is described by |φn〉
at time t, then the probability that it is described by |φm〉 at time t+δt
is Tmnδt where
Tmn =
max(Jmn, 0)
〈ψn(t)|ψn(t)〉
, (3)
Jmn = 2 Im
[
ℏ
−1 (〈φm|〈ψm(t)|)H (|φn〉|ψn(t)〉)
]
(4)
and the states |ψn(t)〉 are the states of the rest of the world, (elements
of SR where S = SC ⊗SR), which are the coefficients of the experience
basis states in the expansion of the universal state vector with respect
to this basis:
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|φm〉|ψn(t)〉.
2In passing, let us note that an answer to the question “Why don’t we see superpositions
of macroscopic states?” is that there is no experience state describing such seeing. A
superposition of two experience states is not, in general, an experience state.
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How does this solve the problem of probabilities in the relative-state in-
terpretation? I haven’t yet defined what I mean by the probabilities that
occur in (2) above. But I don’t know how to define probabilities in any
physical theory. Popular definitions of probabilities are couched in terms of
frequencies — but then they seem to me to be wrong, or at best circular; or
in terms of degree of belief — but then they are not appropriate to physics.
If it is to have the kind of objective meaning that is needed in physics, “prob-
ability” has to be taken as a primitive, undefined, term. Moreover, for its
use in physics maybe one has to restrict the sorts of thing to which the word
can be applied. I’m not sure that I know what would be meant by the ob-
jective probability of a proposition being true. I have the firmest sense that
I understand objective probabilities when they refer to events happening.
Then one could possibly essay a definition of the objective probability of a
(future) event as “the degree of expectation of the event which is rational for
a fully informed observer”, though this is more an elucidation than a defini-
tion. According to the version of quantum mechanics being proposed here,
events happen in the experience of a conscious system (and only there, in the
case of events like quantum jumps). It is therefore appropriate, and I claim
comprehensible, for probabilities to occur in this part of the theory; and they
do so as primitive terms, but with the meaning that I have indicated above.
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE
Except in the preceding paragraph (where my use of them will probably
strike some of my audience as odd; I will explain), I have tried to avoid the
words “subjective” and “objective”, though it might seem natural to use
them for the distinction between what I have called “internal” and “exter-
nal” statements (indeed Nagel uses them in the title of one of his early papers
on the topic [13]). I think this would be a mistake. When this distinction
is applied to quantum mechanics as I have been trying to do, the class of
internal statements includes all the statements that we are used to making in
classical physics (more precisely: it includes translations of all the external
statements of classical physics, using the type of translation between inter-
nal and external that I discussed in connection with tensed and tenseless
statements). Among such statements there is already a distinction between
subjective and objective, so there are both subjective internal statements
and objective internal statements. For example, I would make the subjective
statement that the hair of most people in this room is a kind of green, though
the objective fact, I understand, is that the colours in question are various
shades of brown. Both statements are internal statements, made from inside
one particular component of the state vector of the universe.
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This is why I used the term “objective probability”, even though proba-
bilities only refer to internal statements. I want to make the same distinction
between objective probabilities as physical facts and subjective probabilities
as degrees of belief that we would make in a classical stochastic theory. In
ignorance of the way that Schro¨dinger’s diabolical experimenter prepared his
device with the cat — not knowing which radioactive material he used, or
how much of it, or how lethal was the poison — I might be prepared to state
how probable I think it is that the cat will survive after an hour in the box,
and to bet in accordance with that subjective probability; but there is a fact
of the matter about how many radioactive nuclei there are in the box, and
what their half-life is, and this determines the actual objective probability
that the cat will survive for an hour. To spell this out in recognition of
the internal nature of my statements, I should call this the probability that
my experience in the next hour will not include a transition to seeing the
cat dead. But since all my statements about the world are internal — they
cannot be anything else — I am entitled to say (or at least to assume, and I
will usually be right) that if I see the cat dead, then it is dead. My failure
to spell out pedantically the internal status of my utterances is not just a
shorthand but a justified assessment of what constitutes reality.
REALITY
Which describes reality — the internal view or the external view? Both
seem to have a good claim. As objective scientists, we might want to say that
the external perspective is one which describes the whole of reality, whereas
the internal perspective gives a partial or misleading view. This, we might
consider, is the deep and true reality which quantum mechanics has revealed
to us: all the components of the universal state vector (the “many worlds”,
to use a familiar but unhelpful phrase) really exist, and it is only because of
the limitations of our perceptual apparatus that we are not directly aware of
them. On the other hand, one could take the view that the first allegiance of
a scientist is to the results of experiments; if anything is real, they are. Thus
one of the many worlds is real; the others form a shadowy sort of potential3
which governs the evolution of the real world.
If there is a dispute here, it is surely a barren one. It doesn’t matter
which of |Ψ(t)〉 or |φn(t)〉 on page 9 we call “real”. This must mean that
the two assertions “|Ψ〉 describes reality” and “|ψn(t)〉 describes reality” are
3“Potential” here is a doubly appropriate word. The other components of the state
vector represent outcomes which were potential but are not (from the internal perspective)
actual; and they contribute to the evolution of the actual state in a way which is similar
to the contribution of a potential function to the motion of a particle.
11
compatible, which is to say that “reality” has different senses in the two
statements; and this is understandable if one of the statements is an internal
one and the other is external.
It may be necessary to insist that abandoning the projection postulate in
the external view of the universe is not to deny the reality of the projected
component in which we find ourselves. Nagel also [14] has emphasised that
internal statements should not be regarded as less true or complete than
external ones. Indeed, there are some truths to which there can be no access
from an external perspective, and no expression as external statements; they
are none the less truths. Among these, for example, are facts about the
quality of experience; I suggest that facts about the outcome of experiments
have a similar status. We have already noted that the various statements of
the outcomes of an experiment, although they contradict each other when
viewed externally, are all as true as an empirical statement can be when
viewed in their own context. It is no denial or denigration of the reality of
an experimental result to say that there is a description of the world — not
just a different description, but a different kind of description — in which
the result features as just one component of a superposition of state vectors.
A similar contextualisation of truth and reality has been advocated by
Simon Saunders, whose understanding of quantum mechanics in terms of
decoherent histories [15, 16, 17] is close to the interpretation proposed here.
HOW MANY WORLDS? HOW MANY MINDS?
Describing the Everett interpretation in terms of many worlds or many
minds only exposes one unnecessarily to charges of metaphysical profligacy.
Orthogonal components of a state vector are not separate worlds. There is
only one world, and it has one state vector. That state vector contains a
number of possible experiences, but no more minds than one would expect
from a classical description of the world (one, if one is a solipsist; the number
of fertilised human ova, if one is a Catholic; the number of human beings
beyond one’s favourite stage of development, if one is a speciesist; ...). From
an external point of view, there are a number of possible experiences; many of
those experiences belong to the same mind. It seems to me to be a mistake to
describe this multiplicity of experiences as a multiplicity of minds [12, 1, 9],
since it makes the correspondence between minds and brains many-to-one.
The mistake is to confuse brain states with brains.
This mistake is similar to one made by Deutsch [8], in which form it can
perhaps most clearly be seen to be a mistake. Deutsch takes the two-slit
experiment with electrons to demonstrate that each electron going through
one of the slits must be knocked off course by another electron which went
12
through the other slit. This electron lives in “another world”, and is analo-
gous to the other minds postulated by many-minds theorist. But the state
of the universe in the two-slit experiment, with one electron, is in an eigen-
state of electron number, and the eigenvalue is 1. There is only one electron.
Equally, there is only one brain for each human observer, and therefore only
one mind.
SUMMARY
1. One must distinguish between an external statement about a physical
system and internal statements made within the system. An internal
statement is necessarily relative to a particular perspective.
2. A perspective in a quantum system consists of:
(a) a conscious system;
(b) an instant of time;
(c) an eigenstate of experience.
3. An external statement about a quantum system (in particular, the
universe) consists of a description of its state vector as a function of
time. The physical law to which this statement is subject is that the
state vector obeys the Schro¨dinger equation.
4. An internal statement in a quantum system is a description of an ex-
perience of a particular conscious system at a particular time. The
physical law to which this statement is subject is that the experience
state changes stochastically according to the transition probabilities
(2).
It is often said that among the problems concerning the relation between
classical and quantum mechanics is the question “What determines which one
of the classically allowed states is in fact actualised?” [6]. If we accept that
physics has been forced to abandon determinism, we should not be surprised
that there is no answer to this question; but there is still a puzzle about the
way in which indeterminism is incorporated by quantum mechanics, with its
apparently deterministic equation of motion. The argument of this paper
has been that the relation between different classical outcomes to a quantum
experiment is analogous to the relation between different instants of time (an
analogy which has also been made by Lockwood [12]) and also to the relation
between different centres of consciousness. We should no more expect to be
able to answer “Why did the experiment have that outcome?” than “Why is
it now now?” [11] or “Why am I me?”
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